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I. DEVELOPMENT OF LITTORAL JURISDICTION
A. Historical Background
It has long been recognized in international law that the boundaries
of coastal nations include the adjoining seas. However, despite recent
world efforts to reconcile geographical limits in respect to such sea bound-
aries, the matter remains unsettled.' In general, navigable waters are
grouped in three basic categories: inland waters, marginal seas, and the
high seas. The marginal or territorial sea is along a nation's coast and is
sovereign with the exception of the innocent passage of foreign vessels.'
The inland waters of a nation are all waters on the landward side of the
marginal sea including the waters within the land area such as bays and
estuaries.3
The acceptability of prescribed water zones by the world community
has an extensive history. Except for the exercise of private law, the
Romans, who had great influence on the development of other modern
legal systems, evidenced little interest in maritime law and the products
of the sea.4 Occasional claims of mare clausum in surrounding sea areas
were primarily military tactics designed to secure for Rome the maritime
frontiers of an expanding empire. 5
* LL.B., University of Pennsylvania; LL.M., University of Miami (International Law).
1. E. McDOUGAL & W. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS (1962); A. SHALO-
WITZ, SHORE AND SEA BOUNDARIES (1962).
2. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947) ; Cunard S. S. Line v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
100 (1927).
3. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (1964).
4. D. JOHNSTON, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF FISHERIES 158 (1965).
5. Id.
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The fundamental conflict that now exists between the accepted
principle of the freedom of the seas and the expanding claims of coastal
states in regard to adjoining waters is a relatively recent one. The concept
of mare adjacens, the right of littoral nations to exercise control over
coastal waters, was first introduced in the Middle Ages. It enabled Nation
States with centralized authority, an emerging political phenomenon of
the era, to exercise wider control over their subjects.6 Generally, the rights
asserted in such sea areas were not those of ownership, but of jurisdiction.
Exploration and colonization in the 16th and 17th Centuries led to sweep-
ing claims. In 1609 a papal decree allotted to Spain the vast areas of the
Pacific, the Caribbean, and the Gulf of Mexico. Portugal was allotted the
Indian Ocean and the South Atlantic.7
In contrast, Mare Liberum, the freedom of the seas doctrine, did not
emerge until the 17th Century. It was initiated in 1808 by Hugo Grotius, a
brilliant Dutch scholar.' For centuries, because of the vastness of the sea
and the limited relationship between States, the use of the sea was not
subject to rules.9 All property, stated Grotius, is based on possession. Since
the open seas cannot be seized or encompassed, they are incapable of true
ownership, and hence belong to all mankind. Though unacceptable at the
time to powerful maritime powers, such as France and England, the doc-
trine gradually gained world support.'0
The problem of reconciling the concept of the freedom of the seas
with diverse claims of littoral jurisdiction was ultimately resolved by the
imprecise "cannon-shot" rule, the range by which coastal waters could be
controlled by cannon-shot on shore."1 Discerning the need for more ac-
curate measurement, President Jefferson in 1793 announced that the
United States would regard its territorial waters "as restrained for the
present to the distance of one sea league or three geographical miles."12
Although the United States has generally adhered to the three-mile terri-
torial sea policy, its jurisdiction has been extended beyond the three-mile
limit for customs control' 3 and defense purposes. 4
Presently, the most consistent supporter of the three-mile rule is
Great Britain. In varying degrees of acceptability, many other nations,
including France, Germany, Holland, Greece, Turkey and Japan have ad-
hered to the limit, subject in many cases to fishing and other rights. Russia,
Italy, Portugal and Spain have traditionally opposed such limit as inimical
6. P. JESSUP, LAW OF TERRITORIAL WATERS AND MARITIME JURISDICTION (1927); C.
MEYER, THE EXTENT OF JURISDICTION IN COASTAL WATERS (1937).
7. C. CoLomBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 46 (1962).
8. H. GROTIUS, MARE LIBERUM (1608).
9. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case [19511, I.C.J. 116.
10. D. Johnston, supra note 4 at 166-71.
11. H. Kent, Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
12. Id.
13. Anti-Smuggling Act of 1935, 49 STAT. 517 (1935).
14. 62 STAT. 799 (1948).
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to their national interests. 15 Norway, because of abnormal coastal con-
figuration and historical use, secured extended jurisdiction in adjoining
sea areas by international arbitration. 6 Several South American nations
have asserted jurisdiction over exorbitant distances at sea, claiming the
areas as a part of the so-called Continental Shelf. The possibility of inter-
national settlement of the general issue, however, is seemingly near at
hand. At a recent meeting of the Geneva Convention the membership
narrowly missed agreement on a six-mile territorial sea limit by a single
vote.
In September, 1945, President Truman, by proclamation, claimed for
the United States jurisdiction and control of the sea-bed resources of the
Continental Shelf lying off its shores.'8 In answer to charges of incon-
sistency, the State Department explained that it did not extend United
States sovereignty or affect the nature of the high seas above the shelf,
and that it confirmed to all nations the right to free and unimpeded navi-
gation. 9
Thus began a new round of encroachments in traditional high seas
areas. Alerted to the economic value of off-shore resources, other nations
took similar unilateral action. Individual concepts of the extent and
make-up of continental shelf areas were, for the most part, vague and ill-
defined. Conflicting viewpoints were finally resolved by the Convention
on the Continental Shelf, one of four far-reaching Geneva Conventions
on the High Seas.' 0 In the international agreement the Continental Shelf
is broadly defined as the sea-bed and subsoil of the off-shore submarine
areas, outside the territorial sea "to a depth of 200 meters, or beyond that
limit to where the depth of the superadjacent waters admits the exploita-
tion of natural resources of said areas."'"
As in the Truman Proclamation, the sovereignty of coastal nations
was strictly limited. It could in no way impair the "legal status of the
superadjacent waters of the high seas or that of the air space above those
waters.1 22 The exercise of authority must not "impede the laying or main-
tenance of submarine cables or pipe lines on the Continental Shelf ' 23
or involve "unjustifiable interference with navigation, scientific research,
fishing or conservation of living resources of the sea."24
Though all four Conventions impinge in one respect or another on
exclusive littoral fishing jurisdiction, the restraints may be regarded as
15. U. N. Doc. AlConi. 19-4 (1960) (Geneva Conference Records).
16. Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries Case [1951], I.C.J. 116.
17. A. SHALoWITz; M. McDOUOAL & W. BURKE, supra note 1.
18. 28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 718 (1953).
19. Id.
20. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578
(1964).
21. Id., art. I.
22. Id., art. III.
23. Id., art. IV.
24. Id., art. V.
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negligible. To date, the extension of -such controls has been effected'in
most' cases by unilateral action. It varies considerably in extent, some
States claiming a fishing zone of six miles, a few claiming as much as 200
miles, while the majority claim between ten and fifteen nautical miles.21
The failure of the Geneva Conventions to settle territorial sea bound-
aries, the open-end delineation of the Continental Shelf and the general
vagueness regarding the scope of fishing jurisdiction in high seas areas
apparently has little effect upon the assertion of wider fishing controls by
coastal states. Of far greater import is world recognition of fisheries as a
national resource, the major technological advances in the highly com-
petitive fishing industry, and the urgencies of conservation.26 In fact these
protective considerations are spelled out in the Convention on Fisheries
and Conservation, and thus may almost be regarded as a mandate.
B. The Climactic California Case of 1947
Because of their substantial economic importance, recent develop-
ments in off-shore oil and other natural deposits have caused complex
questions to be raised with respect to ownership of territorial waters. The
litigation which followed from these disputes, though often limited to
questions of boundary delineation, has established a framework of general
application. The purpose of this study is to make an analysis of these
rulings, their historical and legislative origin, and to consider their impact
on subsequent state and federal legislation. Involved in this inquiry are
recent statutes of Florida and the United States which regulate fishing in
territorial waters and adjoining sea areas.
Before 1947, at which time the Supreme Court handed down the land-
mark decision in United States v. California,27 it had been established that
state authority existed over inland waters.2" The issue in the California
case arose from a dispute over proprietary rights to oil-producing lands in
the state's territorial waters. The Court in this case, and later in two
companion cases 29 involving Louisiana and Texas, found that the federal
government, not the state, had paramount rights in the submerged lands
within the three-mile marginal belt along the nation's coast. The facts in
the Louisiana case were similar to those in the California case in that, like
California, the State of Louisiana was admitted into the Union "on an
equal footing with the original states in all respects whatsoever."'3 Be-
cause of its special pre-admission status, the situation in respect to Texas
25. 112 CONG. REc. 22, 972 (1966).
26. W. Chapman, Bank of the World's Fertility, COLUM. J. OF WORLD Bus. (Feb. 1967).
27. 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
28. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1945). The so-called "Pollard Rule" had used language
that indicated that states not only owned tidelands and soil under navigable inland waters,
but also owned soils under waters within their territorial jurisdiction, whether inland or not.
29. United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339 U.S.
707 (1950).
30. Admitted to Union in 1812.
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presented a legal dilemma. Before its annexation by the United States in
1845, it had briefly existed as an independent nation. The Court avoided
this difficulty by asserting that "when Texas came into the Union she
ceased to be an independent nation; she then became a sister state on
equal footing with the other states.""1
What conclusions can be drawn from the three cases? First, the Court
found no previous case considered by it that resolved the federal-state
conflict over the ownership of a state's marginal sea. 2 The Pollard de-
cision33 applied only to inland waters. Second, the protection and control
of the three-mile belt has been and is a function of national external
sovereignty and is of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to en-
gage in commerce and to live at peace.34 Finally, the cases spelled out the
nature of federal rights in the area and the inseparability of United States
dominium (jurisdiction) and imperium (sovereignty) .3
By establishing full federal sovereignty and control over the three-
mile territorial waters, the Court foreclosed California's efforts to establish
a superior right.3' Had the Court in the Texas case based the decision
solely on the issue of title, as the term is generally understood, the ruling
would be difficult to rationalize. "The crucial question," said the Court "is
not merely who owns the bare legal title . . . . The United States here
asserts rights ... transcending those of a mere property owner. 3 7
The issue of submerged lands ownership is only one of several con-
siderations that affect federal and state relationships in territorial waters.
Following the California ruling, the decision in Toomer v. Witsell cast
considerable light on the broad question of jurisdiction and control of the
marginal sea area.38 This decision affirmed state jurisdiction in such waters
except where paramount federal rights are involved. It should be empha-
sized, however, that state fishing regulations in the Toomer dispute were
nullified on Constitutional grounds. Similarly, in a Louisiana case, asser-
tion of federal authority was upheld with respect to off-shore drilling
operations where the central issue was of a civil and political nature. 9
As in Toomer the ruling was based on Constitutional factors. By contrast,
the frequently cited case of Skiriotes v. Florida,4° where an offender of a
state sponging law was apprehended outside territorial waters, is a sound
example of permissible state jurisdiction. In upholding Florida's authority
31. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1950).
32. A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 1 at 8, n.9. About 50 cases, all of which were rejected, were
cited by California in support of state ownership of submerged lands.
33. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1945).
34. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 34-35 (1947).
35. United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707 at 719 (1950).
36. E. BARTLETT, THE TmELANDS OIL CONTROVERSY, 203 (1953).
37. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 at 29 (1947).
38. 334 U.S. 365 (1948).
39. Gravois v. Travelers Indem. Co., 173 So.2d 500 (La. 1965).
40. 313 U.S. 69 (1941). See also A. Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64
U. MICH. L. REV. 639 (1966).
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the Supreme Court advised that the controlling consideration in the matter
was the absence of conflicting federal legislation41
Aroused by the legal implications in the California case, and de-
termined to vest ownership of potentially rich submarine resources in the
individual states, Congress moved to reverse the effect of the ruling. The
eventual result was the Federal Submerged Lands Act of 1953.42 Though
the new law granted to coastal states title and ownership of the submerged
lands under their marginal sea boundaries, it is necessary to underline the
limitations on these grants. These are to be found, not only in the legisla-
tive proceedings, but in the statute itself.
II. FEDERAL SUBMERGED LANDS ACT OF 1953
A. Legislative History
While the decision in the California case was still pending, the battle-
ground over ownership of submerged lands in territorial waters was shifted
to Capitol Hill. Anticipating the outcome of the case, a bill was introduced
which would have required the United States to issue a quit claim to at
least a part of the marginal sea. After passage by both houses, the law was
vetoed by President Truman. 3 This was by no means the end of the
matter. Scientific advances in off-shore drilling operations presented tempt-
ing sources of revenue to purse-poor state governments. Encouraged by a
more complacent administration, a new bill worked its way through Con-
gress with little or no active opposition, and in 1953 was promptly signed
into law by President Eisenhower."
As stated in the title, the scope of the law was:
To confirm and establish the titles of the states to lands beneath
navigable waters within such lands and to natural resources
within such lands and waters, to provide for the use and control
of said lands and resources, and to confirm the jurisdiction and
control of the U.S. over the natural resources of the seabed of
the continental shelf seaward of state boundaries."
According to the Act the seaward boundary of a state is a line three
geographical miles distant from its coast line with the proviso that:
nothing in this section is to be construed as questioning or in any
manner prejudicing the existence of any state's seaward bound-
ary beyond three geographical miles if it was so provided by its
constitution or laws prior to or at such time such State became
a member of the Union or if it had been heretofore approved by
Congress....
41. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 74 (1941).
42. 67 STAT. 29 (1953).
43. 92 CONG. REC. 10660 (1946).
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1301 (1964).
45. 67 STAT. 29 (1953).
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In no event may such boundary extend from the coast line "more than
three geographical miles into the Atlantic Ocean or more than three marine
leagues into the Gulf of Mexico." '46
Within this area of territorial waters, the United States retained all
its "navigational servitude and rights in and powers of regulation and
control for the constitutional purposes of commerce, navigation, national
defense and international affairs," as well as rights to resources beyond
this line seaward within the Continental Shelf.4 7 Thus not only were the
seaward boundaries of the States determined and their coastal control in
these waters established, but they were also given title and ownership to
the subsoil under these waters, and the power over such lands and natural
resources in accordance with applicable state law.4"
In effect Congress enacted a limited extension of the Pollard doctrine49
(state ownership of inland waters) to include ownership by the states of
at least three miles of the marginal sea. As to the method for perfecting
claims for extending the seaward boundary of a state, the Act is silent.
However, a reading of the legislative proceedings indicates that it could
be accomplished by agreement or adjudication."
It is a well established rule of statutory construction that the intent
of the legislative body, expressed or implied, governs its interpretation.
This intent may be inferred from the legislative history of the Act and
from the circumstances attending its enactment. Implicit in the passage
of the Submerged Lands Act, as previously mentioned, was a desire by its
sponsors to reverse the status of federal ownership in territorial waters.
The proponents of the measure, as well as spokesmen for the State Depart-
ment, took pains to explain that the proposed grants to the states were
purely domestic in nature, and not intended to usurp or diminish the gov-
ernment's management of foreign policy.5 This was emphasized by Presi-
dent Eisenhower two years later when urged by Senators Holland of
Florida and Daniel of Texas to issue an Executive Directive establishing
full state sovereignty in territorial waters to the coastal states.52 In deny-
ing the plea, the President declared that the United States would not
deviate in any way from maintaining its traditional national policy with
respect to territorial waters.5"
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1301(a) (2) (1964).
47. 43 U.S.C. § 1314 (1964).
48. Bayitch, Survey of International Law, 16 U. OF MiAMI L. REv. 253 (1962).
49. H. Kent, Historical Origins of the Three-Mile Limit, 48 AM. J. INT'L L. 537 (1954).
50. A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 1, at 124. "It is a matter for the Courts to determine or
for the United States through Congress and the legislatures of the several states to reach an
agreement upon. The pending bill does not seek to invade either province," 99 CoNe. REc.
2620 (1953) (remarks of Sen. Cordon).
51. The Department is concerned with such provisions of proposed legislation as
would recognize or permit the extension of the seaward boundaries of certain states
beyond the three-mile limit. In international relations the territorial claims of the
states and nations are indivisible. The claims of the states cannot exceed those of the
nation.
28 DEP'T STATE BULL. 718 (1953).
52. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 48 (1964).
53. Id. at note 50,
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Part of the difficulty with those who sought to widen state control in
marginal sea areas apparently arose from a misunderstanding of concepts
of ownership and jurisdiction. According to Professor Hyde, there is in
substance a real distinction between a right of sovereignty over a particular
area and a right to use a preventative or protective jurisdiction over or
within such area. 4 In order to rationalize properly the varying degrees
of authority which a nation and state may exercise over the sea, this basic
distinction must not be misunderstood. As a matter of fact, it was em-
phasized by Congress several months later in the enactment of the Outer
Continental Shelf Act. 5
B. Judicial Review
Determination of seaward boundaries under the Submerged Lands
Act presented a relatively narrow judicial problem. Most of the states
entered the Union with no defined maritime boundary in their acts of
admission. Thus they acquired finite authority for the first time by reason
of the federal grant under the 1953 statute. 56 In contrast, there was more
complexity in delineating marginal sea boundaries with respect to those
few states which entered the Union with congressionally approved bound-
aries in excess of the three-mile limit. Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, Missis-
sippi and Florida all claimed such boundaries.5" The federal government,
however, has traditionally resisted state claims beyond three miles on the
theory that state boundaries could not exceed the federal limits.
Because of the controversial nature of article 4, it was subjected to
Constitutional challenge by Rhode Island and Alabama. 58 In upholding
the Constitutionality of the Act as a valid exercise of congressional author-
ity, the Supreme Court did not pass on the problem of boundary delinea-
tion. 9 This test was to come later. The decision, however, dissipated any
doubt in respect to original ownership of the submerged lands. For, if such
ownership did not in fact exist, Congress was powerless to convey these
marginal sea areas to the littoral states. The ruling also added substance
to the federal paramount rights doctrine by establishing that, in making
direct grants to the individual coastal states, something more than bare
property rights was involved.6"
A second, and more significant judicial test of the Submerged Lands
Act, followed several years later. In November, 1957 the United States
Solicitor General filed an amended complaint in the Supreme Court against
Louisiana, Texas, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida seeking to limit their
54. I. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW (1945).
55. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1964).
56. A. Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 U. MICn. L. REV. 639 (1966).
57. Id.
58. A. SIALOWiTZ, supra note 1 at 126 n.25.
59. Id. at 128.
60. Id. at 128 n.31.
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territorial waters to three geographical miles seaward from the ordinary
low water mark to the Continental Shelf.6 '
The claims of Mississippi and Alabama were predicated on clauses
in their acts of admission which stated that their coastal boundaries in-
cluded all islands within six leagues of the shore. A somewhat similar
rationale was employed by Louisiana. 2 The Court rejected this viewpoint,
holding that although the islands were a part of the state, the only water
areas similarly included were the various three-mile belts around such
islands.6" The Court further found no true conflict between these states
and the Federal government, since the acts of admission evinced no at-
tempt by the Federal government to claim any more of the marginal sea
than that sanctioned by its national policy.6
In the issues involving Texas and Florida, however, a conflict between
state and federal policy was squarely presented. The opinion with respect
to Florida was handed down separately.65 Both states had entered the
Union with congressionally approved boundaries in the Gulf of Mexico
three leagues from the shore. The Court, however, reconciled the dispute
by indicating the inherent power of the Executive branch to control
the exercise of certain activities within these congressionally approved
boundaries.
The power to admit new states resides in Congress. The Presi-
dent, on the other hand, is the constitutional representative of
the United States in its dealings with foreign nations. From the
former springs the power to establish state boundaries; from the
latter comes the power to determine how far this country will
claim territorial rights in the marginal sea as against other
nations. 66
It further stated
It may indeed be that the Executive, in the exercise of its power,
can limit the enjoyment of certain incidents of a congressionally
conferred boundary, but it does not fix that boundary."
From the foregoing it is clear that the United States foreign policy
in this regard does not involve matters of purely domestic concern. In
establishing the sea boundaries of coastal states under federal grant, the
Submerged Lands Act itself affirmed this principle. Moreover, it was
further supported by specific statements by proponents of the measure. 68
Thus the Supreme Court confirmed that Florida and Texas were en-
61. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960).
62. Id. at 66, 82.
63. Id. at 83.
64. Id. at 33.
65. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1961).
66. United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1, 35 (1960).
67. Id. at 51 (emphasis added).
68. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DiGEsT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 43-50 (1964).
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titled to the marginal sea boundaries previously approved by Congress
at the time of their admission. It is quite clear, however, regardless of
whether these rights are truncated by paramount federal authority, both
states are free to exercise appropriate jurisdiction and control in these
extended territorial water areas.6 9
III. FLORIDA TERRITORIAL WATERS ACT OF 1963
A. Background of Statute
As previously mentioned, the Truman Fisheries Proclamation of
194570 was the first of a number of actions, both federal and state, de-
signed to exploit adjacent waters and to extend wider jurisdiction over
them. These moves were prompted in some measure by the failure of the
Geneva Conventions on the High Seas in 1958 to reconcile differences
with respect to the width of a state's territorial waters and the exclusive-
ness of adjacent sea areas for fishing use.71 As previously mentioned, how-
ever, more important considerations were involved. Though the right of
all nations to engage in fishing outside the territorial waters of a coastal
state has been a recognized principle of international law for many years,
maritime nations began to regard unlimited fishing as a serious threat to
their economy and food supply.72 Consequently, many states entered into
bilateral and multilateral treaties for the conservation of fishing re-
sources.
73
In 1963, after consultation with Washington, Canada unilaterally
expanded her coastal jurisdiction over fishing to a distance of twelve
miles.7 1 Within a period of three years both the State of Florida and the
United States passed laws requiring fishing licenses for foreign vessels in
territorial and adjacent waters.75
In substance the Florida Territorial Waters Act of 1963 was enacted
to protect state resources,76 to secure them for the citizens of Florida, and
to deny to "nationals of alien, neutral or hostile powers to draw upon the
resources of water long considered by the immemorial usages of all
civilized peoples a part of our state and nation. 77
Relying on Florida's right to "exercise full sovereignty and control
of the territorial waters of the State of Florida" the Act provides that
no fishing licenses shall be issued in the following cases:
69. A. Gross, The Maritime Boundaries of the States, 64 U. MIcH. L. REV. 639 (1966).
70. 10 FED. REG. 12304 (1945).
71. See note 1 supra.
72. See note 26, supra.
73. D. Johnston, supra note 4.
74. 48 DEP'T STATE BULL. 518 (1963).
75. Discussed infra, Parts III and IV.
76. FLA. STAT. § 370.21 (1967).
77. The presence of soviet fishing trawlers in territorial waters of United States, espe-
cially along the Florida coast was discussed before a special investigative committee of the
House of Representatives in July 1963. Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 84 before the Subcomm.
for Special Investigations of the House Armed Services Comm., 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
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" (1) to vessels 'owned in whole or in part by an alien power-which-
Subscribes to the doctrine of international communism' or which
'shall have signed a treaty of trade friendship or alliance or non-
aggression pact with any communist power.' 8
(2) to any subject or national of a power which 'subscribes to
the doctrine of international communism.!
(3) generally to 'any individual who subscribes to the doctrine
of international communism' regardless of nationality.79
With regard to alien vessels, the Board of Conservation is instructed to
grant or withhold such licenses on the basis of reciprocity and
retortion unless the nation concerned is designated as a friendly
ally or neutral by a formal suggestion transmitted to the gover-
nor of the State of Florida by the Secretary of State of the U.S.
In the case of a formal suggestion the Board is instructed to
grant a license without regard to reciprocity to vessels of such
nation.80
In general terms the Act also provides that it is unlawful for
any unlicensed alien vessel to take by any means whatsoever, or
having taken possess any natural resource of the State's terri-
torial waters, as such waters are described by Article 1 of the
Constitution of Florida.8 '
Prescribed penalties are imposed on violators 'provided that
nothing therein shall authorize the repurchase of property for a
nominal sum by the owner upon proof of lack of complicity in
the violation or undertaking.' 2 Finally, the Act provides that 'no
crew member or master seeking bona fide asylum shall be fined
or imprisoned thereunder.8 "
The new law was employed for the first time in February, 1964
against Cuban fishermen. They were arrested by federal authorities
while fishing in Florida territorial waters off the Dry Tortugas. 4 At the
time federal law would not support prosecution. The State Department
filed protests with Cuba and the United Nations, and turned the men over
to state authorities.8 5 In a Key West court the officers were convicted and
fined. The crew members were released. 8
At first glance the Florida Fishing Act appears to present a few
problems. It remains to be seen, for example, in what respect it conflicts
with current federal fishing legislation and international commitments,
and, finally, to what extent it may fail to meet Constitutional standards.
78. FLA. STAT. '§370.21(2) (1967).
79. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(3) (1967).
80. Id.
81. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(4) (1967).
82. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(8) (1967).
83. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(9) (1967).
84. See Miami Herald, Feb. 6, 1964, § A at 2, col. 6.
85. 50 DEP'T STATE BULL. 276 (1964).
86. Miami Herald, Feb. 20, 1964, § A at 1.
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B. Relationship of Florida Territorial Waters Act
to Federal Submerged Lands Act
Senator Holland of Florida, a major sponsor of the Submerged Lands
Act, stated that its principal purpose was to "preserve in status quo the
exact rights, whatever they may be, of the State of Florida-or any other
state (in any forum where a state may be heard) upon the question.""7
Similar expressions as to the limited scope of the grant were made by other
proponents of the bill.88 In short the Act was primarily directed toward
establishing sea boundaries of submerged lands ceded to coastal states
under a federal grant. Further, in confirming Florida's sea boundary claim,
the Court took special pains to explain that the ruling was domestic in
nature and that the cession should in no manner be construed as a de-
parture from the traditional three-mile water zone espoused by the United
States in pursuance of its national policy.89
We now turn to a consideration of the question of domestic jurisdic-
tion in marginal waters, a topic superficially touched upon earlier. Under
the Commerce Clause of the Federal Constitution it has been long estab-
lished, provided there is no conflict with federal law, that the regulation
of fishing in territorial waters is within the police power of the individual
states. A leading case to this effect is Corsa v. Tawes,9° in which a Mary-
land fishing statute was attacked on the ground that it constituted undue
interference with fishing vessels engaged in interstate commerce. In up-
holding the statute, the Court stated that it did not represent an unreason-
able use of the state's police power, and hence was applicable to residents
and nonresidents alike.
A number of Supreme Court decisions have had the effect of formu-
lating basic rules for the enactment of coastal fishing regulation. In par-
ticular it would appear that the cases of Skiriotes v. Florida9' and Toomer
v. Witsell,92 though producing opposite results, provide a framework of
general application. Recall that in the former case, Florida's arrest of an
offender outside its territorial waters was found to be a valid exercise of
state authority. The state, advised the Court, has a legitimate interest in
the protection of its sponge fisheries, and the statute so far as it applied to
87. 99 CONG. REC. 2622 (1953).
88. "It [determination of the boundaries] is a matter for the courts to determine or
for the U.S. through the Congress and legislatures of the several states to agree upon.
The pending bill does not seek to invade either province." 99 CONG. REC. 2620(1953) (remarks of Sen. Cordon).
89. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1961).
90. 149 F. Supp. 771, 773 (D. Md. 1957): "Since the decision in Manchester v.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1890), 139 U.S. 240, 11 S. Ct. 559, 351 L. Ed.
159, it has been beyond dispute that in the absence of conflicting Congressional
legislation under the commerce clause, regulation of coastal fisheries is within the
police power of the individual states under the doctrine of Cooley v. Board of
Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 13 L. Ed. 996.
91. Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
92. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 365 (1948).
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conduct within the territorial waters of Florida, in the absence of conflict-
ing Federal legislation, is within the police power of the state."3
It is now beyond dispute that the right of a state to regulate fishing
in its coastal waters is subject to superior federal authority. This, it ap-
pears, is not the sole limitation. A review of Toomer and like cases indi-
cates that state controls must also meet Constitutional standards. In
Toomer a South Carolina fishing law required nonresidents to pay a license
fee of $2,500. The fee for residents was only $25. The Court found the
statute to discriminate against nonresidents as it was virtually exclusion-
ary. In the opinion of the Court such discrimination was a violation of the
Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Constitution.94
The previous discussion should not be construed as inhibiting the
right of coastal states to take necessary legislative measures for the pro-
tection and conservation of natural resources. Encouragement for this view
appears in the Federal Submerged Lands Act and in the litigation that
followed. Thus, there can be no doubt that both Congress and the Supreme
Court intended to leave the matter of domestic jurisdiction over marginal
sea areas to the individual states, indicating it to be in the public interest
for the states to manage and conserve their natural resources.95
Interpretation of the Florida fishing statute as essentially domestic
in character and geographically limited in scope, demonstrates that it is
not in basic conflict with the Federal Submerged Lands Act. Other con-
siderations, however, appear to be involved. Leaving aside for a moment
the Constitutionality of the Florida law, it remains to be determined in
what respect, if any, it contravenes the 1964 and 1966 federal fishing
statutes, and the Geneva Conventions.
IV. FEDERAL TERRITORIAL WATERS ACT OF 1964
A. Description and Purpose
At the lengthy congressional hearings dealing with activities of for-
eign vessels in United States coastal waters, a need to regulate and con-
trol such vessels was deemed necessary." Recent increase in fishing viola-
tions by foreign vessels revealed the inadequacy of current United States
legislation. Federal laws did not adequately set forth what constituted
illegal acts by alien vessels, nor were there any provisions for seizure and
forfeiture of ships and cargo, or penalties against officers and crew mem-
bers for illegally fishing in United States waters. Under existing law the
only recourse was the expulsion of the offending ship and crew. 7
93. See Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47 (1924), where federal jurisdiction was upheld over a
United States citizen residing in a foreign country.
94. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
95. Term "natural resources" in sec. 2 (e) of the Submerged Lands Act is defined as in-
cluding "oil, gas and other minerals, and fish, shrimps, oysters, clams, crabs, lobsters, sponges,
kelp and other marine and plant life but does not include water power or the use of water
power for the production of power."
96. 109 CONG. REc. (1963); 110 CONG. REC. (1964).
97. Id.
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Senator Bartlett pointed to illegal fishing activity in Alaska's terri-
torial waters, with as many as 300 foreign vessels engaged in coastal fish-
ing in this area during a brief period.98 Also reported was the illegal
presence of Cuban fishing vessels in Florida's territorial waters.9 Specially
noted was an alarming increase of Soviet and Japanese fishing fleets off
the coast of Massachusetts. Testimony was also submitted as to the hostile
presence of Russian fishing trawlers off Florida's east coast, presumably
engaged in the monitoring of United States outer space exploration at Cape
Kennedy.100
In general, the new law makes it unlawful for a foreign vessel, and
any person in charge of such vessel, to engage in fishing in the territorial
waters of the United States or to take any Continental Shelf fishery
resource which appertains to the United States, except as provided by an
international agreement, or by authorization issued by the Secretary of
the Treasury.' 0 ' The bill also establishes penalties for violators, and pro-
vides for seizure and forfeiture of any violating vessel and its catch. En-
forcement regulations are prescribed under the joint responsibility of the
Secretaries of the Treasury and the Interior.0 2
The federal statute contains two important exceptions to the general
prohibition against foreign fishing vessels. The first exception recognizes
that the United States may find it desirable to permit such activity through
international agreements.0 3 The second provides for the taking of desig-
nated species of fish subject to specific conditions and approval by author-
ized officials. 04
Finally, provision was made for the Secretary of State, with con-
currence of the Secretaries of the Treasury and Interior, to permit re-
search vessels to fish in United States territorial waters where the research
vessel is owned and operated by an international organization of which
the United States is a member. 105
B. Relationship to Florida Fishing Statute
A number of provisions in Florida's current fishing law indicate
far-reaching efforts to deny fishing privileges in coastal waters to the Com-
munist community. Since it is the responsibility of the state to identify the
ideological nature of the offending ship and crew members, the enforce-
ment of the statute appears to be fraught with political consequences.
Aside from moot questions of Constitutionality and conflict with federal
fishing regulation, this raises the interesting question of whether the
98. Id.
99. Hearings Pursuant to H. Res. 84, supra note 77.
100. Id.
101. 78 STAT. 194 (1964).
102. Id. § 2.
103. Id. § 1.
104. Id.
105. Id. § 3.
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Florida law represents in any way a challenge to the government's man-
agement of foreign affairs.
It is quite easy to understand the exasperation of Florida's law-
makers with regard to the proximity of the Communist-dominated island
of Cuba, the foraging activities of its fishing vessels in local waters, and
the unwelcome and seemingly hostile presence of Soviet trawlers off Cape
Kennedy. Perhaps we should also estimate in what measure their action
was motivated by the Supreme Court decision of 1961, which confirmed
Florida's sea boundary under the Submerged Lands Act."0 6 If so, it is
rather difficult to rationalize the Act on this basis. The ruling, as previ-
ously mentioned, has only limited domestic significance.
It is true, of course, that at the time the Florida fishing statute was
enacted, there existed no effective sanctions against the use of territorial
waters by foreign fishing craft. Recall that in the 1964 incident, in which
a United States ship intercepted Cuban trawlers in Florida's territorial
waters, the crew members were turned over to state officials for prosecu-
tion. Applying the broad principle of the Skiriotes case, this evidently was
tacit recognition by federal authorities of state police power.
In retrospect it is interesting to speculate what action United States
officials would have taken had the seized vessels carried the flag of a
friendly nation, such as Mexico or Panama. It would probably have
been nothing more than expulsion of the ship and crew. Taking the matter
one step further, assume that the incident took place under similar circum-
stances one year later. Further assume that the offending vessel was not
one of the Communist bloc nations, but one of Communist ideological
affiliation, such as the United Arab Republic. Completing our hypothesis,
suppose that the arrest was made by state rather than federal officers.
Would this not, in at least a theoretical sense, represent a direct conflict
with federal fishing regulation as well as an encroachment on national
policy?
There can be no doubt that under the Constitution, the federal gov-
ernment and the individual states share concurrent jurisdiction over
coastal waters.0 7 It is equally established that the coastal states may take
appropriate action for the protection of natural resources in such areas.
Even so, it is unrealistic to ignore the fact that federal and state interests
are not co-equal. In testing the viability of state fishing regulation, not only
are superior federal rights involved, but it is clear that such legislation
must meet Constitutional standards.1
08
With the foregoing in mind, we shall now consider in what respect
the Florida fishing law is in conflict with the Federal Territorial Waters
Act of 1964. First, it should be noted that the latter makes no ideological
106. United States v. Florida, 363 U.S. 121 (1961).
107. Corsa v. Tawes, 149 F. Supp. 771 (D. Md. 1957).
108. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947). See also Organized Village of Kake v. Egan,
174 F. Supp. 500 (D. Alaska 1959); United States v. Borja, 191 F. Supp. 563 (D. Guam
1961).
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distinction in the licensing of foreign fishing vessels.109 The state law, on
the other hand, not only bars the use of Florida's coastal waters to vessels
of Communist nations, but to all states which "have signed a treaty of
trade, friendship, alliance, etc.,""' with any Communist power. The ex-
clusion is further extended to crew members of such ships, as well as
individuals of all nations who "subscribe to the doctrine of international
Communism.""' In the case of "friendly and neutral nations . . ." fishing
licenses are restricted "on the basis of reciprocity and retortion.""' 2
Second, although the federal law states that the right of foreign fish-
ing vessels is subject to existing treaties,"' in this respect the Florida law
is silent. For all practical purposes, however, this omission is meaning-
less. There is well-established case authority that state law must yield
when it is inconsistent with or impairs the provisions of a treaty or interna-
tional agreement." 4 This is not to say that the Florida Territorial Waters
Act is in violation of existing United States treaties, but merely that it is
subordinate to any international agreement to which the United States is
a signatory." 5
Third, as previously noted, fishing licenses under the Florida statute,
with specific exceptions, will be issued to foreign fishing vessels only on
the basis of reciprocity. Although the language is rather vague, this section,
which provides that the State Department may intervene on behalf of
nations not offering reciprocity to United States fishing vessels, appears
to be restricted to "friendly or neutral nations.""' 6 Even though the state
law appears in some measure to defer to federal executive authority, the
phraseology is rather curious. Is it permissible, for example, for the State
Department to intercede on behalf of fishing vessels owned by a Commu-
nist Block nation and others closely affiliated with it? Conceivably the
state law in such cases could be in direct conflict with United States foreign
policy.
What of the procedure specified in the Florida law for executive in-
tercession? The statute provides that in certain cases the Board of Con-
servation will be instructed to "grant or withhold said licenses . . .by a
formal suggestion transmitted to the governor of Florida by the Secretary
109. 78 STAT. 194'§ 1 (1964).
110. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(2) (1967).
111. FLA. STAT. '§ 370.21(3) (1967).
112. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(3) (1967).
113. 78 STAT. 194 § 1 (1964):
"It is unlawful for any vessel except a vessel of the United States to engage in the
fisheries within the territorial waters of the United States . . .or to engage in taking
any continental shelf resource . . . except as provided by an international agreement
to which the United States is a party."
114. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) ; United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324
(1937) ; Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
115. See art. I of The Geneva Convention on Conservation and Fishing, 17 U.S.T. 138,
T.I.A.S. No. 5969 (1966): "All states have the right for their nationals to engage in fishing
on the high seas subject (a) to their treaty obligations and (b) to the interest and rights of
coastal states as provided for in this convention."
116. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(3) (1967).
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of State of The United States."' 17 This raises the question of whether a
state may prescribe the method by which the State Department may inter-
vene when United States policy conflicts with state jurisdiction. Granting
that the United States Government would in most cases observe the amen-
ities of federal-state intercourse, would state law prevail in the face of
an executive order or directive contrary to the procedure specified in the
Florida statute? Apparently it would not.
Finally, the state fishing law denies licenses to all individuals regard-
less of nationality who subscribe to international Communism."' Without
attempting to pass on the Constitutionality of this prohibition, it raises
a rather complex problem of identification. What, for example, are recog-
nized criteria for determining such ineligible persons? Is the classification
based on subjective factors, or is it limited to membership in avowed sub-
versive organizations? If the latter, the Supreme Court has recently ruled
that a federal law requiring members of the United States Communist
Party to register is a violation of one's constitutional rights under the fifth
amendment." 9 Admission would subject the registrant to prosecution un-
der the membership clause in the Smith Act,'120 as well as the Subversive
Activities Control Act.' 2 '
Although a state clearly possesses the police power to restrain illegal
or hostile persons from fishing in its territorial waters, the underlying
Constitutional question is whether the exercise of this power is unreason-
able and discriminatory. 2
2
C. Federal Extra-Territorial Waters Act of 1966
One of the four freedoms, outlined in article 2 of the Geneva Con-
vention on the High Seas, is the "Freedom of Fishing.' 123 Oddly enough,
of the four Geneva Conventions, the one dealing with Conservation and
Fishing has the least to do with the establishment of boundaries. This
agreement, along with the Convention of the Continental Shelf, deals with
the subject only in a peripheral sense.'24
Since the end of World War II, the operation of foreign vessels, and
particularly those of Japan and Russia, has increased in number and in-
tensity off both coasts of the United States. The adverse effects of such
activity aroused national concern, and eventually sparked congressional
action.'25 It was increasingly apparent that the 1964 law was ineffective,
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
120. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964).
121. 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1964).
122. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1947).
123. A. SHALOWITZ, supra note 1 at 259.
124. Id.
125. S. REP. No. 500, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. REP. No. 1356, 88th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1964).
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and that more extensive measures were needed. 2 ' In 1966 President John-
son signed into law the Federal Extra-Territorial Waters Act, which estab-
lished a coastal fishing zone loosely identified as a twelve-mile limit, nine
nautical miles beyond and adjacent to present territorial waters of the
United States. 27 The new law emphasized that there was no intent to
extend United States sovereignty into the high seas or widen its terri-
torial waters. 2"
The 1958 Geneva Conventions not only confirmed traditional en-
croachments on high seas areas, but created new ones. In addition to
affirming older rights of hot pursuit, 129 the prevention of piracy,'30 and the
transportation of slaves,"' the treaties established the need to prevent pol-
lution,"12 the right to lay and protect cables and pipelines on the sea-bed,"'
to explore and exploit the natural resources of the Continental Shelf," 4
and finally the right and duty to adopt conservation measures for the pro-
tection of living resources."15
Almost all littoral nations by unilateral action have now extended
fishing control into open sea areas. In one respect the federal Act differs
from that of other members of the world community. By extending the
width of the new fishing zone from the outer limits of the territorial sea,
instead of its baseline," 6 it permits a future widening of its control in the
event an international agreement is reached with respect to the width of
territorial waters.
Though several members of Congress evinced concern that foreign
fishing vessels were often equipped with electronic gear, which inferen-
tially could be put to intelligence use,"37 the main thrust of the new law
was directed to the conservation of off-shore fisheries and the protection
of the United States fishing industry.18 Whether the new legislation is
capable of accomplishing this purpose is open to conjecture. It is the con-
sidered opinion of many that the root of the trouble with the United States
fishing industry is inefficiency and its failure to keep pace with tech-
nological advances." 9 Others wryly point to the fact that fish are notori-
ously unconcerned with boundary lines.
126. S. REP. No. 1280, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) ; H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966).
127. 80 STAT. 908 § 2 (1966).
128. Id.
129. Geneva Conventions on the High Seas, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200 (1962).
130. Id., arts. 14-22.
131. Id., art. 13.
132. Id. arts. 24-25.
133. Id., arts. 26-29.
134. Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578
(1964).
135. Geneva Convention on Fishing and Conservation, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969
(1966).
136. 80 STAT. 908 § 2 (1966).
137. 112 CONG. REC. 23885 (1966) (remarks of Rep. Cramer).
138. 112 CONG. REC. 12977 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
139. 112 CONG. REc. 12978 (1966) (remarks of Sen. Gruening).
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The final section- of the41966 Act states that it is not designed to
extend or diminish in any way the domestic jurisdiction- of individual
States with respect to territorial waters. 140 In a sense this is tacit recog-
nition by the United States of the complexity and lack of uniformity of
coastal fishing jurisdiction. Any attempt by the United States to establish
uniformity would, of course, be resisted by the states as a violation of
powers vested in them under the Constitution. Thus it would seem possible
for a domestic vessel proceeding from New Jersey to Maryland's terri-
torial waters, and fishing en route, to be subject to separate and distinct
fishing laws of three states. Further, it is conceivable that choice-of-law
rules might be applicable to such vessel, regardless of specific location of
the infractions, to selected penalties by all three jurisdictions.' 4 '
As stated, the primary purpose of the Extra-Territorial Waters Act
is the conservation of United States fisheries in areas contiguous to the
territorial sea of the United States' 4 It is evident that the extension of
federal jurisdiction was not intended to change the status quo, or infringe
in any way on the domestic jurisdiction of individual states in territorial
waters. The Act itself makes this perfectly clear. 4 3
V. RELATIONSHIP OF FEDERAL AND FLORIDA FISHING
STATUTES TO GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The Geneva Conventions sought to establish a new framework of
international cooperation. It was generally recognized that old concepts
of freedom of the seas must be subordinated to the more realistic concerns
of littoral nations. Actually this development had been in process for some
time. It had become widely accepted that various zones in the high seas
should be under the control of coastal states for certain limited and
mutually advantageous purposes including customs, safety, sanitation
and fishing, without otherwise infringing on the common use of the high
seas by all nations.' 4
4
Encroachments on high seas areas were not only authorized by the
Geneva Conventions, but encouraged. This is particularly true with
regard to the treaty on Fishing and Conservation and the Convention on
the Continental Shelf. Although a complicated procedure was established
for scientific study of fisheries and the settlement of fishing disputes under
the aegis of the United Nations, 45 no effort was made to establish sea
140. 80 STAT. 908 § 4 (1966).
141. L. Moreau, Restriction oj Freedom of the High Seas, 44 HARV. INT'L L. Rav. 167
(1967).
142. 80 STAT. 908 § 1 (1966).
143. "Nothing in this Act shall be construed as extending the jurisdiction of the
States to the natural resources beneath and in the waters within the fisheries zone
established by this Act or in diminishing their jurisdiction to such resources beneath
and in the waters of the territorial seas of the United States." 80 STAT. 908 § 4
(1966).
144. H. SHALOwITZ, supra note 1.
145. U.N. CHARTER arts. 8-12.
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boundaries of littoral jurisdiction. Thus, the Federal Acts of 1964 and
1966 represent contemporary concepts of international law which appear
to be in general accord with the Geneva Conventions. 146 It is questionable,
however, whether the loose framework of the Conventions is a compelling
factor in the current expansion of sea frontiers and the widening of per-
missible fishing jurisdiction. This development is evidently prompted by
substantial economic considerations and world concern regarding con-
servation of natural resources. 47
Because of its evident political coloration, can it validly be stated
that the Florida fishing statute is in contravention of the Geneva treaties?
Apparently not in any practical sense, and possibly not even in any the-
oretical sense. Long before the so-called "cannon-shot" rule, it had become
universally established that with the exception of the innocent passage of
foreign vessels, a littoral nation possesses sovereign and unfettered con-
trol of its territorial waters.148 Under the Constitution this sovereign juris-
diction is, of course, shared by the individual coastal states. A nation's
sovereignty has even been extended to its ships on the high sea. 49 In
general these principles of national sovereignty are incorporated into the
Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 5 °
Further, the Florida statute, as is the case of all coastal state fishing
regulations, is essentially domestic in scope. Though sharing joint juris-
diction with the United States in marginal waters, the role of the state is
obviously subject to superior federal authority. Hence we are forced to
conclude that the Florida law cannot in any sense be deemed as inimical
to existing United States treaties. Such matters lie exclusively and un-
reservedly in the federal domain. We are also reminded that in all in-
stances where state and federal legislation appear to be in direct conflict,
federal, not state authority will prevail.''
VI. CONCLUSION
Even a superficial study of the Florida Territorial Waters Act of
1963 clearly indicates that it is at odds with its counterpart, the federal
Act of 1964. We can dismiss from consideration the federal Act of 1966,
as it is applicable to areas beyond the sea boundaries of individual coastal
states. The Florida law, which strictly limits the issuance of permits to
foreign fishing vessels, appears chiefly concerned with their political align-
ment and affiliation. In this connection we need to speculate under what
146. H.R. REP. No. 2086, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). Note letter of D. McArthur II,
Assistant Secretary of State to E. Garmatz, Chairman of Merchant Marine and Fisheries
Committee, May 20, 1966.
. 147. "The coastal State exercises over the Continental Shelf sovereign rights for the pur-
poses-of exploring it and exploiting the natural resources," art. II, Geneva Convention on
Fishing and Conservation, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5969 (1966)..
148. P. JESSUP, TERRITORIAL WATERS (1962).
149. Case of the S.S. "Lotus," (1927), P.C.I.J., ser. A, No. 9.
.150. 15 U.S.T. 1606, T.I,A.S., No. 5639 (1964).
151. Cases cited note 114 supra.
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circumstances the State of Florida would feel compelled to enforce its fish-
ing statute. Unquestionably, since national policy would prevail under any
circumstance, such possibilities must be regarded as extremely remote.
Another questionable provision in the state law is the requirement
that licenses be issued to vessels of "friendly and neutral nations" on the
basis of "reciprocity and retortion." In keeping with existing United States
treaties, this limitation is absent from the federal statute. Again we are
obliged to conclude that the likelihood of enforcing this provision is virtu-
ally nonexistent. Here, as in the previous instance, federal authority
would be paramount.
In all fairness it should be mentioned that the Florida statute con-
tains a procedure, though somewhat complicated, for federal intercession.
Its effect, however, should be viewed as persuasive rather than binding. We
find it difficult to rationalize any situation that would compel United States
compliance. There are too many avenues available to Washington, tradi-
tional and otherwise, for indicating its political intent.
In establishing that a state fishing law is generally foreclosed by con-
tradictory federal authority, perhaps we should take into account one
possible exception. What if the United States, for whatever political pur-
pose is deemed necessary, declines to exercise its authority? Recalling the
Cuban episode, it seems not at all unlikely that, under similar circum-
stances, state fishing jurisdiction would be permitted to govern. In essence
the matter would thus be relegated to one of domestic concern. The impli-
cations of such event are clear and unmistakable. Admitting that the
Florida fishing statute controverts the federal Act in a number of impor-
tant aspects, the state law must be regarded as collateral rather than
antithetical to its federal counterpart.
In comparing the two fishing statutes, not to be overlooked is that,
except for scientific study and State Department intervention, the federal
Act of 1964 similarly excludes foreign fishing vessels from United States
territorial waters. 5 2 The significant difference, of course, is Florida's de-
termination to deny such areas to ships, crews and individuals tainted
with Communist dogma. In summary, it seems safe to conclude that the
Florida Territorial Waters Act of 1963 is in no way a challenge to United
States treaty obligations and the management of its national affairs, and,
further, that it bears only an innocuous relationship to the Federal Terri-
torial Waters Act of 1964.
Our inquiry must therefore turn to the question of Constitutionality.
A study of the legislative proceedings indicates that the enactment of the
state law was prompted in large measure by the presence of Soviet and
Cuban trawlers in Florida's territorial waters. 5 ' In an effort to make the
152. 78 STAT. 194 § 1.
i53. Statement of the Subcomm. for Special Investigations of the House Comm. on
Armed Services, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Russian Trawler Traffic in U.S. Territorial
Waters (Comm. Print 1963).
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exclusion more embracing, possibly for the purpose of making it less
discriminatory, the Act evidently goes much further. Besides withholding
licenses for foreign fishing craft, directly or indirectly affiliated with Com-
munist powers, the prohibition is extended to crew members and indi-
viduals, regardless of nationality, who subscribe to the doctrine of
international Communism.154
There can be no dispute that Florida's sovereign jurisdiction in re-
spect to its territorial waters includes the right to enact legislation for the
protection of its natural resources. Whether such enactment conforms
with Constitutional requirements is, of course, another matter. In this
connection we have had prior occasion to mention the restrictive effect of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause. 5 ' Also possibly involved is the ap-
plicability of the fifth amendment against self-incrimination. 6' In efforts
to implement the statute it is difficult to see how these questions can prac-
tically be avoided.
In objectively reviewing the matter of joint jurisdiction, the possi-
bilities for employing the Florida fishing statute would appear to be rather
negligible. Its enforcement is too well circumscribed by superior federal
legislation and perhaps, more importantly, by the exigencies of national
policy.
154. FLA. STAT. § 370.21(3) (1967).
155. U.S. CONST., art. IV § 2.
156. 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1964) ; 50 U.S.C. § 783 (1964).
1968]
